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Title IV-D of the Social Security Act' mandates that states
provide specific child support enforcement services in order to re-
ceive federal funding under the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program.2 Most states, however, have not carried
out the mandate to locate absent fathers and collect child support
payments from them. Out of approximately 9.4 million mothers
living without their children's fathers in the spring of 1988, only
fifty-one percent of these women had child support awards and
only twenty-six percent had received their full child support the
previous year.3
This Comment argues for allowing mothers of children with
absent fathers to bring suit under 42 USC § 1983" to compel states
to provide child support enforcement services under Title IV-D.5 A
t A.B. 1989, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 1993, The University of Chicago.
1 42 USC §§ 651-669 (1988).
2 AFDC is a federal-state cooperative program intended to ensure that needy families
with children deprived of parental support due to death, disability, or desertion receive wel-
fare benefits. 42 USC §§ 601-617 (1988). The program requires that "the State [have] in
effect a plan approved under [Title IV-D] and operate [ ] a child support program in sub-
stantial compliance with such plan." 42 USC § 602(a)(27).
3 The State of America's Children 1991 27 (Children's Defense Fund, 1991).
4 Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
42 USC § 1983 (1988).
5 Only two appellate courts and five district courts have ruled on this issue. Four courts
have denied the suits. Carelli v Howser, 923 F2d 1208 (6th Cir 1991) (reversing the district
court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss); Wehunt v Ledbetter, 875 F2d 1558
(l1th Cir 1989); Mason v Bradley, 789 F Supp 273 (N D 11 1992); Oliphant v Bradley, 1992
US Dist LEXIS 8975 (N D Il1 1992). Three courts have permitted the suits. Behunin v
Jefferson County Dept. of Social Services, 744 F Supp 255 (D Colo 1990); Beasley v Gins-
berg, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 16682 (D Conn 1989); Howe v Ellenbecker, 774 F Supp 1224 (D
SD 1991). See text accompanying notes 14-28.
The University of Chicago Law Review
successful § 1983 suit would result in a binding injunction upon
the state to enforce Title IV-D or choose between judicial oversight
of the state's child support enforcement program and loss of AFDC
funds.
A § 1983 remedy is crucial in these cases because families have
no other means of compelling the state to provide child support
enforcement services. The only alternative would be an implied
right of action under Title IV-D,7 but the Supreme Court has
adopted a strong presumption against implied rights of action: the
plaintiff must affirmatively demonstrate that Congress intended to
allow a private right of action under the federal statute.8 Needy
families with children probably could not meet this burden be-
cause the text and history of Title IV-D provide no explicit indica-
tion of congressional intent to create a private right of action.
Section 1983, on its face, provides a cause of action for any
violation of a federal statute. In Maine v Thiboutot,0 the plaintiffs
sued under § 1983 claiming they were deprived of AFDC benefits
due them under the Social Security Act. Rejecting the state's argu-
ment that § 1983 be limited to civil rights or equal protection stat-
utes, the Court held that § 1983 may be triggered whenever a per-
son acting under color of state law violates a federal statute." But
the Court in Thiboutot did not elaborate a standard for determin-
ing, in the context of a specific statute, whether § 1983 provides a
0 See Rosado v Wyman, 397 US 397, 420 (1970) (remanding with instructions that the
state have reasonable time either to conform Title IV-A program with AFDC funding condi-
tions, or to choose to forego federal AFDC funding); Pennhurst State School & Hospital v
Halderman, 451 US 1, 54 (1981) (White dissenting) ("If [the state prefers not to give up
federal funding], it should propose a plan for achieving compliance, in which event, if it
satisfied the court, a decree incorporating the plan could be entered and if the plan was
unsatisfactory, the further use of federal funds could be enjoined.").
See Cort v Ash, 422 US 66, 78 (1975) (outlining four-factor inquiry for implied private
right of action).
' Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v Thompson, 478 US 804, 812 n 9 (1086) (review-
ing post-Cort cases that stress strict fidelity to congressional intent in implied right of ac-
tion analysis).
' The silence of the statute and legislative history on the question of a private right of
action does not jeopardize the possibility of an action under § 1983. Section 1983 enforce-
ment is available unless the defendant-state actor demonstrates that Congress intended to
disallow a private right of action. Wright v Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority,
479 US 418, 423 (1987). See also Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v National Sea
Clammers Ass'n, 453 US 1, 27 n 11 (1981) (Stevens concurring) ("[T]he burden is properly
placed on the defendant to show that Congress, in enacting the particular substantive stat-
ute at issue, intended an exception to the general rule of § 1983."). Because § 1983 is an
express congressional authorization of private suits, its use does not raise the separation of
powers concerns inherent in judicially created remedies.
10 448 US 1 (1980).
1 Id at 6-8.
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cause of action. Since Thiboutot, the Court has allowed § 1983 en-
forcement only if the statute meets two requirements. First, the
statute must create "enforceable rights."12 Second, the statute
must lack a "comprehensive remedial scheme."' 3
Section I of this Comment discusses how lower courts have ap-
proached the issue of § 1983 enforcement of Title IV-D. Section II
demonstrates that Title IV-D creates enforceable rights on behalf
of needy families with children. Section III demonstrates that Title
IV-D does not provide a comprehensive remedial scheme.
I. LOWER COURT APPROACHES: WEHUNT AND CARELLI
In Wehunt v Ledbetter,4 mothers of children with absent fa-
thers brought suit under § 1983 against the Georgia Department of
Health and Human Services for its failure to establish the pater-
nity of their children and secure child support on their behalf. The
Eleventh Circuit held that Title IV-D does not create enforceable
rights on behalf of needy families with children because they are
not the intended beneficiaries of the statute."5 The court reasoned
that the primary purpose of Title IV-D was to recoup the state's
welfare expenditures on behalf of needy families by collecting child
support from absent parents. While the AFDC program itself was
intended to benefit needy families with children, Title IV-D was
intended to benefit the public treasury and taxpayers by reducing
the present and future welfare rolls.1 " The court pointed to the leg-
islative history of Title IV-D:
The problem of welfare in the United States is, to a consider-
able extent, a problem of the non-support of children by their
absent parents. Of the 11 million recipients who are now re-
ceiving [AFDC funds], 4 out of every 5 are on the rolls be-
cause they have been deprived of the support of a parent who
has absented himself from the home.
The Committee believes that all children have the right
to receive support from their fathers. The Committee bill, like
the identical provision passed by the Senate (H.R. 3153) last
12 Suter v Artist M, 112 S Ct 1360, 1366 (1992); Wilder v Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496
US 498, 508 (1990).
1 Sea Clammers, 453 US at 19-21; Wright, 479 US at 423.
14 875 F2d 1558 (11th Cir 1989).
15 Id at 1565-66.
16 Id at 1565 ("the goal of Title IV-D was to immediately lower the cost to the taxpayer
as well as to lessen the number of families enrolling in welfare in the future-benefits to
society as a whole rather than specific individuals").
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year, is designed to help children attain this right, including
the right to have their fathers identified so that support can
be obtained. The immediate result will be a lower welfare cost
to the taxpayer but, more importantly, as an effective support
collection system is established fathers will be deterred from
deserting their families to welfare and children will be spared
the effects of family breakup.1"
The court also pointed to the statutory provision requiring
AFDC families to assign their child support rights to the state in
return for AFDC aid-an indication that Congress intended to give
states the ability to recoup welfare funds expended due to the de-
linquency of absent parents.18 Having decided that Title IV-D cre-
ates no enforceable rights for needy families because they are not
the intended beneficiaries of the statute, the court found it unnec-
essary to determine whether the statute provides a comprehensive
remedial scheme.1 9Two years later, in Carelli v Howser,20 the Sixth Circuit re-
jected a § 1983 suit against the state of Ohio for its failure to locate
absent parents, establish paternity, establish support obligations,
and enforce existing support orders. After reviewing the legislative
history of Title IV-D, the court rejected the Wehunt view and con-
cluded that Congress intended to "protect both needy families
with children and the public fisc."' The court nonetheless rejected
the § 1983 remedy because it found that Title IV-D already pro-
vided a comprehensive remedial scheme. First, the court noted, Ti-
tle IV-D and the implementing regulations issued by the Office of
Child Support Enforcement establish an elaborate system for pro-
viding mandated services, recapturing funds, meeting performance
indicators, and auditing state compliance.22 Second, the auditing
system appeared to be working: the state was audited and assessed
a penalty by the Secretary, which led to the institution of a new
17 Id, quoting Social Services Amendments of 1974, S Rep No 93-1356, 93d Cong, 2d
Sess 42 (1974).
18 Id at 1565-66, referring to the requirements set out in Title IV-A of the Social Secur-
ity Act, codified at 42 USC § 602(a)(26)(A) (1988).
19 Id at 1563. The dissent in Wehunt rejected the majority's view that enforceable
rights were not created, and so went on to analyze the remedial scheme provided by Title
IV-D. Judge Clark found the statute's remedial scheme insufficiently comprehensive to fore-
close a § 1983 action. Id at 1577 (Clark dissenting). For a description of the available reme-
dies, see text accompanying notes 148-51.
20 923 F2d 1208, 1209 (6th Cir 1991).
21 Id at 1211.
11 Id at 1213-15, referring to 45 CFR § 305 (1991).
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collective action program. 23 A court order in this case would have
duplicated the Secretary's efforts to bring the state plan into com-
pliance, and the court concluded that Congress could not have in-
tended such redundancy.
24
The district courts that have considered these questions are
also deeply divided. At least three district court judges have con-
cluded, like the Sixth Circuit in Carelli, that Title IV-D creates
enforceable rights,25 while two have concluded that it does not.26
Three of the district court opinions maintain, like the Wehunt dis-
sent, that Title IV-D does not provide a comprehensive remedial
scheme, 27 while one holds that it does.28 The conflicting resolutions
adopted by these various courts suggest that the current status of
§ 1983 jurisprudence as it applies to Title IV-D needs clarification.
II. TITLE IV-D CREATES ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS ON BEHALF OF
NEEDY FAMILIES WITH CHILDREN
Section 1983 is only available for violations of federal statutes
that create enforceable rights. The Supreme Court outlined the
test for enforceable rights in Wilder v Virginia Hospital Ass'n29
and Suter v Artist M. 0 Part A of this Section examines this three-
part test. Part B describes the statutory language and legislative
history of Title IV-D. Part C shows that Title IV-D satisfies the
Court's test for the creation of an enforceable right.
A. Requirements for Enforceable Rights Under Wilder and
Artist M
In Wilder, the plaintiff was a nonprofit corporation of hospi-
tals that sued under § 1983 for violations of the Boren Amendment
to the Medicaid Act. The Boren Amendment provides that a State
plan for medical assistance must provide for payment
" Id at 1215. The new program was to set time limits on responses to requests for
service and establish priorities for providing service. Id.
24 Id at 1216.
2" Behunin v Jefferson County Dept. of Social Services, 744 F Supp 255, 258 (D Colo
1990); Howe v Ellenbecker, 774 F Supp 1224, 1230-(D SD 1991).
16 Mason v Bradley, 789 F Supp 273, 277 (N D IMl 1992); Oliphant v Bradley, 1992 US
Dist LEXIS 8975, *23 (N D Ill 1992).
" Beasley v. Ginsberg, 1989 US Dist LEXIS 16682 at *22 (D Conn 1989); Behunin, 744
F Supp at 257-58; Howe, 774 F Supp at 1230.
" Oliphant, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 8975 at *26-27.
2, 496 US 498, 508 (1990).
30 112 S Ct 1360, 1371 (1992).
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of the hospital services, nursing facility services, and services
in an intermediate care facility for the mentally retarded...
through the use of rates ... which the State finds, and makes
assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and
adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by effi-
ciently and economically operated facilities.'
The Court concluded that the amendment grants health care prov-
iders enforceable rights to reimbursement rates that are reasonable
and adequate. Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan asserted
three primary grounds for this conclusion. First, health care prov-
iders are the intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment.2
The Court focused on whether the statute provided benefits in fact
to plaintiffs, and whether the language indicated an intent to do
so: "[T]here can be little doubt that health care providers are the
intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment. The provision es-
tablishes a system for reimbursement of providers and is phrased
in terms benefitting health care providers. '3 3
Second, the Boren Amendment imposes a "binding obligation"
on states to adopt rates of reimbursement that are reasonable and
adequate. 4 The Amendment would not be satisfied if the state
made findings that its rates are "reasonable and adequate" and
made assurances to that effect to the Secretary, but did not actu-
ally adopt such rates. The Court explicitly rejected that argument:
"[Petitioner's] argument that the requirements of findings and as-
surances are procedural requirements only . . . would render...
the entire reimbursement provision, essentially meaningless." 35
The Court employed a two-factor analysis to reach its conclu-
sion that the Boren Amendment provided a binding obligation: (1)
it is cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms,36 and (2) the
receipt of federal funds is expressly conditioned on compliance
with the Amendment (the Secretary is authorized to withhold
31 Medicaid Act, 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
32 Wilder, 496 US at 509-10, quoting Golden State Transit Corp. v Los Angeles, 493
US 103, 106 (1989).
33 Id at 510. The Court in Golden State suggested in dictum that a statute does not
create enforceable rights if the benefit to the plaintiffs is merely incidental. 493 US at 109.
Even if the Court were to adopt such an exception to the enforceable rights analysis it
would not affect the determination of whether Title IV-D creates enforceable rights on be-
half of needy families with children. See text accompanying notes 92-101.
" Wilder, 496 US at 512.
35 Id at 513-14.
36 Id at 512, citing 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1987 Supp).
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funds for noncompliance).3 7 The Court reasoned that these factors
distinguished the Boren Amendment from the Developmentally
Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act (DDABRA),38 which it
had held did not create enforceable rights in Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v Halderman.39 Section 6010 of the DDABRA
provided in part that:
Congress makes the following findings respecting the rights of
persons with developmental disabilities:
(1) Persons with developmental disabilities have a right to ap-
propriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such
disabilities.
(2) The treatment, services and habilitation for a person with
developmental disabilities should be designed to maximize the
developmental potential of the person and should be provided
in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal
liberty.40
The Court concluded that this provision was meant merely to
assist or encourage states to improve care and treatment of the
mentally retarded.41 The provision "is simply a general statement
of 'findings' and, as such, is too thin a reed to support the [creation
of] rights" 42 and "[i]f funds cannot be terminated for a State's fail-
ure to comply with § 6010, § 6010 can hardly be considered a 'con-
dition' of the grant of federal funds. ' 4 For a statute to impose
binding obligations, the Court reasoned, states must be provided
clear notice that by accepting funds they are obligated to comply
with the provisions of the DDABRA.44 The Wilder Court applied
this test to the Boren Amendment, where the Secretary was au-
thorized to withhold funds for noncompliance,45 and concluded
that "a State is on notice that it cannot adopt any rates it chooses
and that the requirement that it make 'findings' is not a mere
formality. '46
11 Id, citing 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A). Note that relevant statutory language includes
42 USC § 1396a(a) and (a)(13).
42 USC §§ 6000 et seq (1988).
39 451 US 1, 15-27 (1981).
40 42 USC § 6010 (1976), now codified as 42 USC § 6009 (1988, Supp 1990).
41 451 US at 18.
42 Id at 19.
43 Id at 23.
4 Id at 17.
4" 496 US at 512, quoting 42 CFR § 430.35(c) (1989).
46 Id at 514.
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Third, the Wilder Court found the language of the Boren
Amendment not too "vague and amorphous" to render the Amend-
ment unenforceable by a court.47 "While there may be a range of
reasonable rates, there certainly are some rates outside that range
that no State could ever find to be reasonable and adequate under
the Act. Although some knowledge of the hospital industry might
be required to evaluate a State's findings with respect to the rea-
sonableness of its rates, such an inquiry is well within the compe-
tence of the judiciary. '48
The majority in Artist M also adopted an enforceable rights
analysis,49 though slightly different from that found in Wilder. The
plaintiffs were children who brought suit against the state for fail-
ure to make "reasonable efforts" to preserve and reunite families
as required by the AACWA. The statute provides that:
In order for a State to be eligible for payments under this
part, it shall have a plan approved by the Secretary which...
provides that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A)
prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or
eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home,
and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his
home5 0
The Court concluded that the reasonable efforts provision of the
AACWA does not create enforceable rights on behalf of children. 51
Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist concluded that states
were given "a great deal of discretion" in complying with the stat-
ute, despite the fact that the language of the AACWA was
47 Id at 519.
48 Id at 519-20. Justice Blackmun elaborated on this "vague and amorphous" standard
in his dissent in Artist M. 112 S Ct at 1373-74 (Blackmun dissenting). He concluded that
the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act (AACWA), 42 USC §§ 670 et seq (1988),
which requires that the state make "reasonable efforts" to preserve and reunite families, 42
USC § 671(a)(15), was within judicial competence to enforce because state efforts could in
some circumstances be deemed to violate the statute.
There may be a "range" of "efforts" to prevent unnecessary removals or secure benefi-
cial reunifications that are "reasonable." It may also be that a court, in reviewing a
State's strategies of compliance with the "reasonable efforts" clause, would owe sub-
stantial deference to the State's choice of strategies. That does not mean, however, that
no State's efforts could ever be deemed "unreasonable."
Artist M, 112 S Ct at 1374, citing Wilder, 496 US at 520. See also Golden State, 493 US at
106 (stating, but not explaining, that the plaintiff's interest must not be "too vague and
amorphous" for the judiciary to enforce).
49 112 S Ct at 1366-67.
50 42 USC § 671(a)(15).
81 112 S Ct at 1370.
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mandatory rather than precatory, and that the Secretary was au-
thorized to withhold funds for noncompliance.2 In the Court's
view, the AACWA only requires the state to have a plan approved
by the Secretary and containing sixteen enumerated features; it
does not require the state to actually obey particular provisions of
the plan.53 Justice Rehnquist noted three grounds for this conclu-
sion. First, the AACWA and subsequent regulations were general
and offered no guidance as to what would constitute "reasonable
efforts" at compliance." The particular statutory provision at issue
suggested only that such plan as there was had to apply to all po-
litical subdivisions of the state, not that it actually had to operate
in a specific manner.5 States were thus not provided notice that
"failure to do anything other than submit a plan with the requisite
features, to be approved by the Secretary, is a further condition on
the receipt of funds from the Federal Government."" The Wilder
Court had found, by contrast, that the Boren Amendment and its
attendant regulations elaborated specific factors for determining
the method for calculating rates, so states were given the requisite
notice for the imposition of a binding obligation.5 7
Second, in Artist M, Justice Rehnquist found that the legisla-
tive history of the AACWA revealed that Congress had confidence
in the ability and competence of state courts to discharge their du-
ties under the statute. 8 Third,'a grant of substantial discretion to
the states would not render the "reasonable efforts" clause "a dead
letter." The Secretary retains the authority to reduce or eliminate
payments upon a finding that the state is not making "reasonable
52 Id at 1369.
53 Id.
" Id at 1368-69. See for example, 42 USC § 671(a)(15), (b); 45 CFR § 1356.21(d)(4)
(1991).
5 Id at 1368 ("This section states that the state plan shall 'provid[e] that the plan shall
be in effect in all political subdivisions of the State, and, if administered by them, be
mandatory upon them.' But we think that 'in effect' is directed to the requirement that the
plan apply to all political subdivisions of the State, and is not intended to otherwise modify
the word 'plan.' ").
56 Id at 1369.
17 496 US at 512-14.
58 The Senate Finance Committee Report stated that:
The committee is aware of allegations that the judicial determination requirement can
become a mere pro forma exercise in paper shuffling to obtain Federal funding. While
this could occur in some instances, the committee is unwilling to accept as a general
proposition that the judiciaries of the States would so lightly treat a responsibility
placed upon them by Federal statute for the protection of children.
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1979, S Rep No 96-336, 96th Cong, 1st Sess
16 (1979).
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efforts," for example, if it is not even complying with its own
plan.5 9
Lower courts are divided over whether the analysis in Artist
M modifies or replaces the three-pronged analysis articulated in
Wilder.60 Given that the Court did not explicitly overrule Wilder,
principles of legal interpretation would suggest that the cases
should be harmonized so as to minimize the effect of Artist M
upon § 1983 jurisprudence.6 1 The different results in Artist M and
Wilder can be explained by the fact that the statute in Wilder (the
Boren Amendment) required the state to operate in compliance
with its plan, while the statute in Artist M (the AACWA) merely
required the state to have a plan in place. Thus, the effect of Artist
M is to modify the "binding obligation" analysis from Wilder by
adding another factor. In addition to looking for mandatory rather
than precatory terms and assessing whether the receipt of federal
funds is expressly conditioned on compliance, 2 a court must now
also examine whether the statute or regulations elaborate specific
factors to guide states regarding compliance with the mandate
before concluding that the statute places a binding obligation on
the states."3
Wilder and Artist M thus require that inquiry into whether a
federal statute creates enforceable rights focus primarily upon
three issues: first, whether plaintiffs are the intended beneficiaries
of the statute; second, whether the statute imposes binding obliga-
tions upon states; and third, whether the statute is too vague and
5" 112 S Ct at 1368-9. The impact of the Secretary's power to audit state programs and
cut off federal funding is explored more fully in the text accompanying notes 148-57.
60 Compare Chan v City of New York, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 8341 at *7 (S D NY)
(applying Wilder framework "with the modifications suggested by [Artist M]" to the Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 1974) with City of Chicago v Smith, 1992 US Dist
LEXIS 15068 at *8-9 (N D Ill) (rejecting Wilder analysis of Older Americans Act since
"such readings do not survive" Artist M).
" See generally Cass R. Sunstein, After the Rights Revolution 170, 186-89 (Harvard,
1990).
62 See text accompanying notes 36-37.
63 For an example of the relevancy of regulations, see Artist M, 112 S Ct at 1369, citing
45 CFR §§ 1356.21(d)(4), 1357.15(e)(1) (1991) ("The regulations promulgated by the Secre-
tary to enforce the Adoption Act do not evidence a view that § 671(a) places any require-
ment for state receipt of federal funds other than the requirement that the State submit a
plan to be approved by the Secretary."). See also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984) (reasonable agency interpretations entitled to ju-
dicial deference). It is unlikely that agency regulations are by themselves sufficient to create
enforceable rights because Congressional intent has always been the linchpin of enforceable
rights analysis. The Court has not yet ruled on this issue, but see Wright, 479 US at 438
(O'Connor dissenting) ("Such a result, where determination of § 1983 'rights' has been un-
leashed from any connection to congressional intent, is troubling indeed.").
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amorphous to be enforced by the judiciary. The question that
arises, then, is whether Title IV-D meets these requirements.
B. Title IV-D Provisions Relating to Creation of Enforceable
Rights
Title IV-D requires that states pay child support collections to
AFDC and non-AFDC families. In order to receive benefits, AFDC
families must "assign [to] the State any rights to support from any
other person such applicant may have"' 4 and "cooperate with the
State (i) in establishing the paternity of a child born out of wed-
lock with respect to whom aid is claimed, and (ii) in obtaining sup-
port payments for such applicant .... -65 The purpose of the as-
signment provision is to "reimburse [state governments] for
assistance payments to the family."6 The first fifty dollars of child
support collected each month, however, is paid to the AFDC fam-
ily, and does not affect the family's AFDC eligibility or otherwise
decrease any amount payable to it as state assistance.67 If the state
is able to collect support in excess of the family's AFDC grant,
then it must treat the collection as family income and determine if
the family has become ineligible for assistance payments.6 8 Fami-
lies who are not on AFDC receive the entire amount of child sup-
port that the state collects.6 9
The legislative history of Title IV-D reveals that Congress in-
tended to provide benefits to needy families with children. Con-
gress enacted Title IV-D in 1974 for the purpose of
enforcing the support obligations owed by absent parents to
their children and the spouse (or former spouse) with whom
such children are living, locating absent parents, establishing
paternity, obtaining child and spousal support, and assuring
that assistance in obtaining support will be available under
this part to all children (whether or not eligible for aid under
[Title IV-A]) for whom such assistance is requested. 0
Congress stated that: "all children have the right to receive sup-
port from their fathers . . . . [Title IV-D is] designed to help chil-
42 USC 8 602(a)(26)(A) (1988).
65 42 USC 8 602(a)(26)(B). The applicant need not cooperate, however, if she can estab-
lish "good cause" for failing to do so. Id.
66 42 USC § 657(b)(2).
67 42 USC §§ 602(a)(8)(A)(vi), 657(b)(1).
66 45 CFR § 232.20(b)(1) (1991).
69 42 USC § 657(b)(4)(B).
70 42 USC § 651.
1993]
The University of Chicago Law Review
dren attain this right, including the right to have their fathers
identified so that support can be obtained.
7 1
A series of increasingly strict amendments over the past sev-
eral decades demonstrates congressional concern with strengthen-
ing child support enforcement by states. In 1967 Congress added
amendments requiring states to establish formal programs for
child support recovery from deserting parents, with half the fund-
ing to be provided by the federal government.7 2 Amendments
passed in 1984 require states to implement specific enforcement
mechanisms in order to increase the effectiveness of state pro-
grams.7 Congress further strengthened enforcement mechanisms
in the 1988 amendments to Title IV-D.74
The regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services pursuant to Title IV-D's mandate establish ex-
tremely specific requirements for state child support enforcement
plans. For example, states must respond to requests for service
within precise time limits.7 5 A state must apply these procedures in
71 Social Security Amendments of 1984, S Rep No 93-1356, 93d Cong, 2d Sess 42
(1974). Congress was concerned with strengthening state child support enforcement
programs:
In view of the fact that most States have not implemented in a meaningful way the
provisions of present law relating to the enforcement of child support and establish-
ment of paternity, the Committee believes that new and stronger legislative action is
required in this area which will create a mechanism to require compliance with the
law."
Social Security Amendments of 1973, S Rep No 93-553, 93d Cong, 1st Sess 43 (1973).
72 Social Security Act Amendment of 1967, 42 USC § 602(a)(17) (Supp 1968), repealed
by the Social Services Amendments of 1974, § 6305(c)(8), Pub L No 93-647, 88 Stat 2337,
2360 (1975).
73 Social Security Act Amendment of 1984, 42 USC §§ 654(20), 666 (a), (b) (1988). The
amendment requires that state programs include wage withholding for the automatic recov-
ery of child support and arrearages, posting of security or a bond, garnishments and volun-
tary wage assignments, liens on real or personal property, withholding from tax returns, and
reporting of significant arrearages to credit agencies.
'4 Family Support Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-485, 102 Stat 2352 (1988). The Act con-
tains amendments to Title IV-D requiring states to: provide mechanisms for facilitating the
periodic updating of child support awards, 42 USC § 667(a) (1988); revise the system of
immediate wage withholding, 42 USC § 666(b)(3) (Supp 1990); establish a commission on
interstate enforcement of child support, 42 USC § 666 (1988); and establish an automated
tracking and monitoring system, 42 USC § 654(24) (1988).
75 See 42 USC § 652(h) (1988). The regulations promulgated under the Act require
states to: access all appropriate sources for locating an absent parent and ensure that loca-
tion information is sufficient to take the next appropriate action in a case within seventy-
five calendar days of determining that location is necessary, 45 CFR § 303.3(b)(3)(1991);
establish an order for support or complete service of process necessary to commence pro-
ceedings to establish a support order within ninety calendar days of locating an absent par-
ent or establishing paternity, 45 CFR § 303.4(d); file for paternity establishment or complete
service of process to establish paternity within ninety calendar days of locating the alleged
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at least seventy-five percent of cases reviewed by the Secretary to
achieve substantial compliance with Title IV-D requirements. 6
Lack of substantial compliance will lead to a loss of up to five per-
cent of the state's federal funding.7
C. Title IV-D Creates Enforceable Rights on Behalf of Needy
Families with Children
As this Comment has noted, the Wilder and Artist M inquiry
into enforceable rights focuses on three issues.78 First, whether
plaintiffs are the intended beneficiaries of the statute-does the
statute benefit the plaintiffs, and is it phrased in terms of benefit-
ting them? Second, whether the statute imposes binding obliga-
tions upon states-is the statute cast in mandatory rather than
precatory terms, and is the provision of federal funds expressly
conditioned on compliance with the statute? After Artist M this
turns also on whether the statute and regulations provide specific
guidance to states as to how such compliance may be achieved.
Third, whether the statute is too vague and amorphous to be en-
forced by the judiciary-could state efforts ever be deemed to vio-
late the statute? Analysis of Title IV-D produces affirmative an-
swers to each of these inquiries.
1. Needy families with children are the intended benefi-
ciaries of Title IV-D.
Needy families with children are the intended beneficiaries of
Title IV-D because the statute provides them with specific benefits
and is phrased in terms of benefitting them.7 9 First, Title IV-D
provides needy families with monetary benefits. The state pays
AFDC families the first fifty dollars of child support that it collects
each month from absent parents, in addition to their AFDC
grants.8 0 It pays non-AFDC families the full amount of such sup-
father, 45 CFR § 303.5(a)(1); establish paternity or exclude the alleged father within one
year of the later of successful service of process or the child's reaching six months of age, 45
CFR § 303.5(a)(2); and take appropriate enforcement action within thirty calendar days of
identification of a delinquency or support-related noncompliance, or location of an absent
parent, 45 CFR § 303.6(c)(2).
76 45 CFR § 305.20(d)(2).
7 42 USC § 603(h)(1).
768 See text accompanying notes 32-63.
7' See Wilder, 496 US at 510 ("The [Boren Amendment] establishes a system for reim-
bursement of providers and is phrased in terms benefiting health care providers ...
(emphasis added).
80 42 USC § 657(b)(1).
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port."' Title IV-D also mandates an increase in federal matching
funds from fifty to sixty-six percent of state administrative costs,
8 2
and thus allows states to provide more services to needy families
with children. Second, Title IV-D provides the benefits of pater-
nity determination. These benefits include establishment of a per-
sonal relationship with the parent, establishment of an economic
relationship with the parent, increased access to family medical
histories, inheritance rights, and eligibility for Social Security ben-
efits."3 These benefits are in keeping with Title IV-D's purpose of
"assuring that assistance in obtaining support will be available
under [Title IV-D] to all children." 4
Despite this evidence, the Eleventh Circuit in Wehunt con-
cluded that needy families with children are not the intended ben-
eficiaries of Title IV-D, and thus held that Title IV-D does not
create enforceable rights on their behalf.8 5 The court argued that
Congress intended Title IV-D to benefit the public treasury and
society as a whole rather than needy families with children.86 This
argument is inconsistent with the stated purposes of Title IV-D.
The legislative history of Title IV-D strongly suggests that Con-
gress intended to benefit both needy families with children and the
public treasury:
A major focus in the child-support debate during the 98th
Congress has been the underlying purpose and intent behind
the child-support enforcement program. Some maintained
thatit should aim primarily at recovering AFDC expenses in-
curred because families without child support must rely on
welfare. Others contended that this Federal program ought to
be available as a service to all families in need of assistance in
securing child support, regardless of whether they receive wel-
fare or not. This conference agreement reflects the rationale
stated in both House and Senate bills which reaffirms that the
program should be available to all who need services. This is
an important statement of our intent that the Federal Gov-
ernment should assist in the costs of putting into place a na-
tionwide efficient and effective child-support enforcement sys-
81 42 USC §§ 602(a)(8)(A)(vi), 657(b)(4)(B).
82 42 USC § 655(a)(2)(C).
11 Wehunt, 875 F2d at 1574 (Clark dissenting).
- 42 USC § 651.
15 See text accompanying notes 14-19.
86 Wehunt, 875 F2d at 1565 ("the goal of Title IV-D was to immediately lower the cost
to the taxpayer as well as to lessen the number of families enrolling in welfare in the fu-
ture-benefits to society as a whole rather than specific individuals") (emphasis added).
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tem that enables all children in need of support to receive
timely and expedient assistance . 7
The very language of the legislative history cited by the Wehunt
court suggests that Title IV-D has two beneficiaries. 8
The Sixth Circuit in Carelli examined this same legislative
history and concluded that Congress intended Title IV-D to bene-
fit both needy families with children and the public treasury: "We
see no reason to conclude that the statute must be read to protect
needy families with children to the exclusion of protecting the
public fisc or vice versa. It seems eminently reasonable that Con-
gress intended both purposes to be served."8' 9 The specific imple-
mentation of Title IV-D also supports the conclusion that it has
two intended beneficiaries. Congress would not have provided ben-
efits to non-AFDC families 9°-who are not otherwise a drain on
the public treasury-if it intended Title IV-D to benefit the public
treasury exclusively. Similarly, Congress would not have provided
that AFDC families who assign their support rights to the state
receive the first fifty dollars of support collected each month on
their behalf 91 if it had intended Title IV-D to benefit the public
treasury alone.
In response to the dual beneficiary theory, one could argue
that needy families with children are not entitled to private relief
because they are not the primary beneficiaries of Title IV-D. Six
months after Wehunt, in Golden State Transit Corp v City of Los
Angeles,92 the Supreme Court held that the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA)93 creates an enforceable right on behalf of taxi-
cab franchisees to exert economic pressure on a union during the
collective bargaining process. The Court held that the city could
not interfere with that right by conditioning renewal of the
franchise on settlement of the pending labor dispute. 4 The Court
in dictum suggested one circumstance in which a statute would not
create enforceable rights:
87 130 Cong Rec 23040 (Aug 8, 1984) (statement of Rep. Conable).
8 See the court's quotation from legislative history, reproduced in the text accompany-
ing note 17-especially the last sentence.
9 923 F2d at 1211.
" 42 USC §§ 602(a)(8)(A)(vi), 657(b)(4)(B).
91 42 USC § 657(b)(1).
0 493 US 103 (1989).
29 USC §§ 151 et seq (1988).
493 US at 111 ("the Act protects certain rights of labor and management against
governmental interference").
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In the NLRA, Congress has not just "occupied the field" with
legislation that is passed solely with the interests of the gen-
eral public in mind. In such circumstances, when congres-
sional pre-emption benefits particular parties only as an inci-
dent of the federal scheme of regulation, a private damages
remedy under § 1983 may not be available. 5
This language from Golden State suggests that enforceable rights
may exist only in a statute's primary beneficiaries and not in inci-
dental ones."6 On this view, § 1983 action would be unavailable to
needy families if Title IV-D was primarily intended to benefit the
public treasury and benefits to needy families with children arose
incidentally.9 7
This argument is not convincing because neither of the condi-
tions elaborated in Golden State obtain in the. Title IV-D context.
Title IV-D was not passed "solely with the interests of the general
public in mind."98 At least one of the interests Congress had in
mind in passing Title IV-D must have been that of needy families
with children.99 Also, needy families with children are not benefit-
ted "only as an incident to a federal scheme of regulation." 100
Rather, they reap economic and non-economic gains from specific
statutory provisions. 101 In the absence of these two conditions, it
would be premature to conclude, without further elaboration by
the Court, that needy families with children must be the "pri-
mary" beneficiaries in order to be intended beneficiaries of the
statute.
Thus, the first factor for the creation of an enforceable
right-an intent to benefit the class-is fulfilled. The next ques-
tion that arises is whether Title IV-D meets the second require-
ment for enforceable rights: the imposition of binding obligations
upon the states.
8' Id at 109.
Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA,
91 Colum L Rev 233, 248 (1991) ("may not" indicates that whether a plaintiff is categorized
as an intended or an incidental beneficiary determines whether or not that plaintiff has a
primary federal right, redressable under § 1983).
"1 For similar reasoning in a pre-Golden State case, see Wehunt, 875 F2d at 1565 ("in
enacting Title IV-D Congress was primarily concerned with collecting child support in order
to reduce the welfare rolls").
"B Golden State, 493 US at 109.
99 See text accompanying notes 79-91.
10o Golden State, 493 US at 109.
101 See text accompanying notes 80-83.
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2. Title IV-D imposes binding obligations upon states.
Title IV-D contains the three factors that the Supreme Court
uses to determine whether a statute imposes binding obligations
upon states. 102 First, the statute is cast in mandatory rather than
precatory terms. A "State plan for aid and services to needy fami-
lies with children must ... provide that the State has in effect a
plan approved under [Title IV-D] and operates a child support
program in substantial compliance with such plan."10 3 The state
plan for child and spousal support "must ... provide that such
State will undertake ... to establish the paternity of [the] child"104
and take certain specific measures to ensure effective collection
and disbursement of child support.1 0
5
Second, the receipt of federal AFDC funds is expressly condi-
tioned on compliance with Title IV-D. 10 6 "[I]f a State's program
operated under [Title IV-D] is found as a result of a review.., not
to have complied substantially with the requirements of [Title IV-
D] ... the amounts otherwise payable to the State under this part
... shall be reduced. ' 10 7 The reductions range from one to five
percent depending on whether the state has been found not in sub-
stantial compliance on previous occasions, and are suspended if the
state implements a corrective action plan within an appropriate
time period.108
While it is true that state participation in the AFDC program
is voluntary-a state could elect to not comply with Title IV-D
requirements simply by foregoing federal AFDC funding109-the
same is true of the Boren Amendment in Wilder and the
DDABRA in Pennhurst. Both of these statutes concerned volun-
tary programs but the Court did not analyze either statute in those
102 See text accompanying notes 62-63.
103 42 USC § 602(a)(27) (emphasis added).
104 42 USC § 654(4)(A) (emphasis added).
100 The statute requires that states: notify families at least annually of the amount of
child support collected on their behalf, 42 USC § 654(5); give families the first fifty dollars
of child support collected each month, 42 USC § 657(b)(1); pass laws creating specific reme-
dial devices to ensure effective child support, 42 USC § 666(a)(1)-(9); and comply with other
requirements that the Secretary deems necessary to the establishment of an effective Title
IV-D program, 42 USC § 654(13), such as the provision of support enforcement services
within specified time frames, 45 CFR § 303.6(c)(2) (1991).
100 Wilder, 496 US at 512 (Boren Amendment imposes binding obligations upon states
because provision of federal funds is expressly conditioned on compliance with
Amendment).
107 42 USC § 603(h)(1).
1- 42 USC §§ 603(h)(1), 603(h)(2)(A).
109 Oliphant v Bradley, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 8975 at *23 (N D IlM 1992) ("states are not
obligated to participate in the AFDC program at all").
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terms."' Instead, the Court looked to the mandatory language of
the statute and the express conditioning of federal funds on com-
pliance."' Where these factors were present (as in Wilder) the
Court concluded that the statute imposed a binding obligation,
where they were not (as in Pennhurst) the Court found no such
obligation. This reflects an assumption that states will not choose
to forego federal funding and that the voluntary nature of state
participation in the program does not render Title IV-D's obliga-
tions nonbinding." 2
Third, Title IV-D's obligations are binding because the statute
and regulations elaborate specific factors to guide states toward
"substantial compliance" with the statutory requirements. 113 The
Secretary's regulations require that a state meet detailed audit cri-
teria, employ the required procedures in seventy-five percent of
the cases reviewed," 4 and keep to precise time frames in the per-
formance of various services." 5 States are left with little or no dis-
cretion in deciding how to comply with Title IV-D. In this sense,
Title IV-D more closely resembles the Boren Amendment in Wil-
der than the AACWA in Artist M. The Boren Amendment and its
regulations elaborated factors for determining "reasonable and ad-
equate" reimbursement rates, and the Court held that a binding
obligation was created for states to adopt rates which actually were
"reasonable and adequate.""' The AACWA and its regulations, by
contrast, did not elaborate factors for determining what were "rea-
sonable efforts" at compliance, and the Court held that compliance
with the statute was left to the discretion of individual states." 7
On the other hand, one could argue that Title IV-D's obliga-
tions are not binding because the statute requires only "substan-
tial" compliance, defined by the Secretary as compliance in only
seventy-five percent of the cases reviewed. If a state is free to ig-
nore fully one quarter of those families entitled to services, this
might suggest that it also has a fair amount of flexibility in the
implementation of Title IV-D. Other provisions of the statute also
110 Wilder, 496 US at 502; Pennhurst, 451 US at 11.
u" See text accompanying notes 42-46.
112 Compare Rosado v Wyman, 397 US 397, 420 (1970) (remanding suit to enforce com-
pliance with Title IV-A by instructing state to comply with AFDC conditions or forego
funding).
13 42 USC § 602(a)(27).
124 45 CFR § 305.20(d).
115 See note 75.
116 496 US at 519 n 17, citing 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982, Supp 1987).
117 112 S Ct at 1369.
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support this view.11 Title IV-D lacks any language mandating that
a state actually achieve any of the statute's goals or even comply
with its own plan in order to receive federal AFDC funding. The
Court in Artist M held that analogous language in the AACWA did
not create enforceable rights on behalf of children."' 9
This argument is flawed on two grounds. First, substantial
state flexibility in the implementation of child support programs
contradicts the very purpose of Title IV-D. Title IV-D was enacted
to address the problems of state non-compliance that had arisen
under older, discretionary systems: "[N]ew and stronger legislative
action is required in this area which will create a mechanism to
require compliance with the law. 120 Congress intended to provide
actual services to needy families with children through Title IV-D;
it did not intend merely to encourage states to provide services.
"[O]ur intent [is] that the Federal Government should assist in the
costs of putting into place a nationwide efficient and effective
child-support enforcement system that enables all children in need
of support to receive timely and expedient service." '21 In the
AACWA, by contrast, Congress expressed confidence in the ability
and competence of states to perform their duties under the statute.
This suggested to the Court in Artist M that states retained discre-
tion to decide on compliance mechanisms.22
Second, the requirement that the state operate in "substantial
compliance" with Title IV-D123 is rendered meaningless if the stat-
ute authorizes flexibility in the implementation of the child sup-
port enforcement program. If the statute requires only that the
state have a child support enforcement program in place and
places no restrictions on the implementation of the program, the
Secretary cannot exercise the enforcement power which the statute
so carefully grants.1 24 The state can always claim that it is in sev-
enty-five percent compliance, because it is at least attempting to
employ the required procedures in seventy-five percent of the cases
reviewed; the Secretary's determination that the state must actu-
18 For example, a state must "undertake" to establish paternity and secure support,
rather than simply "establish paternity" or "secure support." 42 USC § 654(4).
11 112 S Ct at 1370, citing 42 USC § 671(a)(15) (1988).
o S Rep No 93-553 at 43 (cited in note 71).
111 130 Cong Rec 23040 (Aug 8, 1984) (statement of Rep. Conable) (emphasis added).
... 112 S Ct at 1369 n 15.
113 42 USC § 602(a)(27).
124 42 USC §§ 603(h)(1), 652(a)(4).
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ally comply with the required procedures would itself not be suffi-
cient to create a "binding obligation" upon states.125
Even assuming that the Secretary could enforce compliance, a
state would always be able to argue that it was in compliance gen-
erally and that specific cases of noncompliance the Secretary might
uncover were merely part of the excluded twenty-five percent.
Congress would not simultaneously create an elaborate mechanism
for child support enforcement and then add a provision which
would eviscerate its own system of oversight.12 The "substantial
compliance" provision is better read not as a desire to preserve
state flexibility in complying with Title IV-D requirements, but
rather as a congressional recognition that the Secretary's review of
cases cannot be expected to be accurate one hundred percent of
the time.
Title IV-D, therefore, imposes binding obligations on states:
the statute is cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms, the
provision of federal AFDC funds is expressly conditioned upon
state compliance with Title IV-D, and Title IV-D and its regula-
tions elaborate specific factors to provide guidance in how to com-
ply with the statute. The next and final question in the enforceable
rights analysis is whether Title IV-D is too vague and amorphous
to be enforced by the judiciary.
3. Title IV-D is not too vague and amorphous to be enforced
by the judiciary.
Title IV-D satisfies the vague and amorphous standard articu-
lated in Wilder because a court could in some circumstances deem
that state efforts violated the statute. Given the extensive and
elaborate requirements articulated in Title IV-D and its attendant
regulations, a court need only inquire whether the state is employ-
ing the required procedures to locate absent fathers, establish pa-
ternity, and collect child support within the specified time
frames. 127 If not, the court would conclude that tate child support
enforcement efforts were in violation of Title IV-D.
Title IV-D is even less vague and amorphous than the Boren
Amendment provision that provides that states reimburse health
care providers at rates "reasonable and adequate" to meet the
125 See note 63.
12e See Wilder, 496 US at 514 (rejecting state argument that Boren Amendment does
not create enforceable right to rates that actually are reasonable and adequate because such
argument would render provision meaningless).
127 See notes 73-75.
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costs of an "efficiently and economically" operated facility.12 The
Court in Wilder held that this language was not too vague and
amorphous for judicial enforcement where the statute outlined
three factors for choosing a method of determining rate reasona-
bleness and adequacy. 12 9 With its specific percentage requirements
and detailed regulations, the "substantial compliance" provision in
Title IV-D gives far greater guidance than the "reasonable and ad-
equate" provision at issue in Wilder.130
Thus, since Title IV-D satisfies all three of the Supreme
Court's requirements for the creation of an enforceable right, Title
IV-D should be read as creating enforceable rights on behalf of
needy families with children. However, one more hurdle remains: a
§ 1983 action is available for federal statutory violations only if the
statute itself does not provide a comprehensive remedial scheme.' 3 '
III. TITLE IV-D DOES NOT PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE REMEDIAL
SCHEME
After Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v National Sea
Clammers Ass'nls3 and Wright v Roanoke Redevelopment &
Housing Authority'"3 two issues determine whether a federal stat-
ute provides a comprehensive remedial scheme: (1) whether the
statute provides for private judicial remedies, and (2) whether the
statute provides a procedure by which plaintiffs can address state
failures to abide by statutory provisions. Where these factors are
present, the Court regards the statutory remedies as exclusive and
will not allow additional enforcement through § 1983. The test en-
sures plaintiffs a remedy for violations of federal statutory
rights.13 4 The presumption is that Congress would not deprive stat-
utory beneficiaries of a means of redress (as provided by § 1983)
without providing for comparable remedies within the statute
itself.3 5
125 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988).
22 496 US at 519 & n 17.
130 45 CFR § 305.20(d)(1)-(2) (1992).
11 See, for example, Smith v Robinson, 468 US 992, 1009-13 (1984) (section 1983 en-
forcement of Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA) not available because statute con-
tains carefully tailored administrative and judicial enforcement mechanisms).
13" 453 US 1 (1981).
132 479 US 418 (1987).
22, See Note, Comprehensive Remedies and Statutory Section 1983 Actions: Context
as a Guide to Procedural Fairness, 67 Tex L Rev 627, 644-53 (1989) (reviewing cases sug-
gesting importance of leaving plaintiffs with judicial remedies).
13 See, for example, Smith, 468 US at 1011 (finding EHA remedial scheme to be com-
prehensive where it ensured "that each child's individual educational needs be worked out
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Part A of this Section examines the two-factor test in Sea
Clammers and Wright for analyzing whether a statute has a com-
prehensive remedial scheme. Part B applies the Sea Clammers/
Wright analysis to Title IV-D and shows that neither factor sug-
gesting a comprehensive remedial scheme is present.
A. Sea Clammers and Wright
In Sea Clammers, fishermen brought suit against federal,
state, and local officials under the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act (FWPCA)3 6 and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanc-
tuaries Act (MPRSA) l37 for their alleged failure to prevent dis-
charges and ocean dumping of waste materials. The Court held
that enforcement mechanisms in the acts were sufficiently compre-
hensive to reveal congressional intent to preclude an implied right
of action.138 The acts contained provisions that granted govern-
ment officials the authority to pursue civil and criminal penalties
for violations,139 permitted any "interested person" to seek judicial
review of certain administrative actions taken under the acts
(within 90 days),"" and authorized citizens to sue for injunctions
to enforce the acts. 4 ' While the plaintiffs did not seek a § 1983
remedy, the Court sua sponte addressed the issue and concluded
that Congress intended the statutory remedies in the FWPCA and
MPRSA to preclude use of § 1983.
The Court turned the dictum of Sea Clammers into law six
years later in Wright. Tenants of low income housing projects
brought suit under § 1983 for alleged overbilling for utilities, in
violation of rent ceilings imposed by the Brooke Amendment to
the Housing Act of 1937142 and the implementing regulations of
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).14 3
Writing for the majority, Justice White concluded that the statute
lacked a comprehensive remedial scheme on three grounds. First,
through a process that begins on the local level and includes ongoing parental involvement,
detailed procedural safeguards, and a right to judicial review").
36 33 USC §§ 1251 et seq (1988).
137 33 USC §§ 1401 et seq (1988).
1" Sea Clammers, 453 US at 15 ("In the absence of strong indicia of a contrary con-
gressional intent, we are compelled to conclude that Congress provided precisely the reme-
dies it considered appropriate.").
19 33 USC § 1319.
140 33 USC § 1369(b).
141 33 USC §§ 1365(a), 1415(g).
142 42 USC § 1437a.
143 Wright, 479 US at 420 n 3, citing 24 CFR § 860.403 (1982).
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the Brooke Amendment and Housing Act made no provision for
private judicial remedies:144 the only remedial scheme provided
within the statute was HUD's authority to conduct audits, enforce
annual contribution contracts, and cut off federal funds from Pub-
lic Housing Authorities (PHA). These mechanisms were thor-
oughly inadequate for HUD to oversee effectively the performance
of over 3,000 local PHAs across the country.145 Second, the PHA
grievance procedures for the resolution of tenant disputes did not
provide any means for tenants to complain about alleged failures
of PHAs to abide by their annual contribution contracts, the
Brooke Amendment, or HUD regulations. 46 There would thus be
few occasions on which HUD would be motivated to sue individual
PHAs for such contractual violations. Third, HUD had apparently
expressed the view that tenants could bring private suits to chal-
lenge PHA calculations of utility allowances: the grievance proce-
dure regulations stipulated that a decision terminating a grievance
proceeding would not affect a tenant's right to seek "judicial re-
view," and proposed HUD regulations that would have limited fed-
eral judicial review were not adopted.1 47
B. Title IV-D Lacks a Comprehensive Remedial Scheme
Title IV-D does not provide the sort of means of private judi-
cial redress necessary to satisfy the comprehensive remedial
scheme test articulated in Sea Clammers and Wright. Title IV-D
requires that a participating state develop and implement a plan to
provide enforcement services; the Secretary is required to approve
the plan,1 48 conduct an audit of the program at least once every
three years to determine if the actual operation of the program
complies with Title IV-D, 49 and (if there is not substantial compli-
ance) reduce the state's AFDC funding by one to five per cent.150
The regulations also require that states locate absent parents, es-
144 Id at 427.
145 Id at 428-29.
148 Id at 426.
147 Id at 426-27, citing 24 CFR §§ 966.57(c), 965.473(3) (1985), 49 Fed Reg 31402 (1984).
146 42 USC § 652(a)(3).
14 42 USC § 652(a)(4).
110 42 USC § 603(h)(1). Funding reductions are suspended if: (1) the state submits a
corrective action plan to achieve substantial compliance within a time period found to be
appropriate by the Secretary, (2) the Secretary approves the plan, and (3) the Secretary
finds that the plan is being fully implemented and the state is progressing according to the
specified timetable to achieve substantial compliance. 42 USC § 603(h)(2).
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tablish paternity, and establish support orders within specific time
frames.151
Absent from the statute, however, are such private judicial
remedies as citizens' suits or judicial review of administrative pro-
cedures. Also absent is any procedure under which needy families
might complain about state failures to abide by Title IV-D. Absent
§ 1983 enforcement, the only remedy available to needy families
with children for state violations of Title IV-D is a generally inef-
fectual complaint filed with the Secretary. Yet the Secretary's only
enforcement tool is reduction of federal AFDC funding, and even
that is available only after an audit and a finding of substantial
noncompliance.152 This mechanism simply is not adequate to the
Secretary's task of enforcing state compliance with Title IV-D, es-
pecially given the widespread failure of states to provide effective
child support enforcement services. 53 Without a § 1983 remedy,
needy families are left essentially without any means of securing
state compliance with the provisions of Title IV-D.54
While the Secretary has not expressed a view as to whether
needy families may bring private suits to enforce Title IV-D, the
remedial scheme of Title IV-D is even less comprehensive than
that of the Brooke Amendment, which the Court in Wright held
did not foreclose § 1983 enforcement.155 Under the Brooke Amend-
ment, tenants were at least provided with grievance procedures for
resolution of disputes arising out of PHA regulations, although
these procedures did not extend to utility allowances, and HUD
itself could sue PHAs to enforce the annual contribution con-
tracts. 56 There are no comparable procedures in Title IV-
D-needy families simply cannot voice complaints regarding the
failure to enforce support obligations, and the Secretary is not au-
thorized to sue state agencies for noncompliance with Title IV-D
requirements. If the Brooke Amendment lacks a comprehensive re-
151 See note 75.
22 42 USC § 603(h); 45 CFR § 305.20(d) (1992).
115 See text accompanying note 3.
'" Needy families with children may have a cause of action under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) against the Secretary for failure to enforce timeframes for service es-
tablished by Title IV-D implementing regulations. 5 USC §§ 701 et seq (1988). See, -for
example, Clarke v Securities Industry Ass'n, 479 US 388, 394-96 (1987) (standing under
APA requires injury in fact and within zone of interests protected or regulated by statute).
However, a successful APA action could at most produce a cut-off of federal AFDC funding;
the Secretary cannot actually compel states to provide child support enforcement services.
5 Wright, 479 US at 427-28.
156 Id.
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medial scheme, then the more inadequate provisions of Title IV-D
must lack one too.
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Sixth Circuit in Carelli
concluded that Title IV-D does provide a comprehensive remedial
scheme, and thus held that needy families with children may not
bring suit under § 1983 to enforce Title IV-D. 157 The Carelli argu-
ment is flawed because it misconstrues the analysis required by
Sea Clammers and Wright. Instead of analyzing Title IV-D in
terms of whether it provided private judicial remedies or complaint
procedures for statutory violations, the court simply noted the
highly complex nature of the auditing scheme and examined how
"effective" the process was in practice: "[Were relief to be
granted,] the court's order would address all the shortcomings the
Secretary has already ordered corrected.' 1 58 The Sea Clammersi
Wright analysis, however, is concerned with the extent of the re-
medial scheme from the perspective of the statutory beneficiaries;
it focuses on whether they are left without a means of redress for
violations of federal statutes.259 While a more effective auditing
process might ultimately lead to provision of more services to
needy families with children, Sea Clammers and Wright do not
suggest that a court examine whether granting private enforcement
would further the efficient system-wide management of the Title
IV-D program.leo
Therefore, since Title IV-D does not provide for private judi-
cial remedies or complaint procedures about state violations, the
statute lacks a comprehensive remedial scheme. Since Title IV-D
also creates enforceable rights on behalf of needy families with
children, these plaintiffs must be granted the right to sue under
§ 1983 for state violations of Title IV-D.
CONCLUSION
Without a § 1983 remedy, needy families with children are
completely deprived of access to the federal courts to secure child
support enforcement services granted them by Title IV-D. This re-
sult is deeply at odds with the Thiboutot presumption that § 1983
is available for federal statutory violations and the line of cases
applying the presumption to particular statutes. Wilder, Artist M,
Sea Clammers, and Wright suggest that the § 1983 remedy is
157 See text accompanying notes 20-24.
Carelli, 923 F2d at 1216.
"' Note, 67 Tex L Rev at 645 (cited in note 134).
'eo See text accompanying notes 132-35.
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available if the statute creates enforceable rights and itself lacks a
comprehensive remedial scheme. Title IV-D meets both of these
requirements. Permitting § 1983 enforcement in these circum-
stances would be true to the Supreme Court's § 1983 jurisprudence
and would provide redress of these families' grievances through the
injunction power of the federal courts.
